From Irish Political Review, September 2002

Assasinating For Peace In Palestine And Ireland

In view of the Panorama revelations—that elements of the British security services in Ireland assassinated as a matter of policy, to remove people the State deemed it necessary to eliminate—it might be worth considering an earlier time and place where such a policy was pursued, particularly as the matter is so relevant today. Sixty-five years ago, in Palestine, a section of the British military took it upon themselves to provide lists to Zionist paramilitary forces, which it armed and trained so that native resistance to colonial rule would be ended. The people who took it upon themselves to do this were of course "rogue elements"—just as today. But they were lovable rogues. Rogues who had their wrists smacked, were later decorated, and went on to bigger and better things elsewhere, utilising what they had learnt thereafter in the service of the Empire.

In 1917, when the Jewish population of Palestine still comprised less than ten per cent, the British Government issued the Balfour Declaration in support of a Jewish National Home. Its phrasing was deliberately ambiguous—as the Arabs were still needed as allies to destroy the Ottoman Empire—but the Zionists took it to be a commitment, at the minimum, to establish a Jewish state within Palestine. When Palestine was conquered and Mandated to Britain, the conduct of Imperial policy tended to confirm this understanding.

In the 20s and early 30s the Jewish population of Palestine was steadily built up, although it was never acknowledged by Britain that the aim was the creation of a Jewish state—under British jurisdiction. Zionists believed that British policy was pro-Arab in not allowing unlimited Jewish immigration, but the general thrust of it was always toward building up a Jewish colony as a ‘higher form of civilisation’—amenable to British interests—in Palestine. By the 30s it was becoming very clear to the local population that they were going to become a minority in their own land within a decade, and there was nothing they were going to be able to do about it. In 1936 there was an Arab revolt, and guerilla activity, primarily directed at the British administration.

The purposeful elements within the British occupation forces, to counter this Arab development, began the development of the military capability of the colonialists. This new Jewish military development—The Special Night Squads—were armed and trained by British officers. And the intelligence services provided them with lists for assassination. The most famous British Officer involved in this was Orde Wingate, who later became famous for his irregular—or terrorist—campaign with the Chindits in Burma.

What effect did this policy have on Jewish siociety in Palestine? The following is taken from a recent article entitled ‘Orde Wingate And The Special Night Squads’, written by Doron Geller which is on the website of the World Zionist Organisation at www.wzo.org.il:

"His first evening in the land of Israel seemed to allow his blazing intensity to take hold of him, focus, and envelop his very being. That first evening, after settling in at Haifa, he went up to Mount Carmel—with its beautiful view of the Haifa Bay area—and met the Chief Intelligence Officer of the Underground Jewish Defense Force, the Haganah. His name was Emmanuel Wilenski.

“Wilenski was unaware, at first, that Wingate knew who he was. Wingate, as was his wont, peered closely into his eyes, and asked Wilenski, "Do you believe in a Zionist State, in an independent state of Israel?” “I am not afraid of answering that. Yes. I do.” Wingate clambered to his feet. “Aha! You do? But do you know what it means? Do you realize that you will have to fight for your independence?” Wilenski replied. “I think, Captain Wingate, that we do.” “But fight! I mean fight! A bloody struggle!” shouted Wingate. “There will be no free Palestine for the Jews unless you fight and win.” He went up to Wilenski and prodded him in the chest. By this time his eyes were blazing. “And you will not win, my friend, unless I teach you how to fight and I lead you into battle.”

“The Jewish Intelligence Officer didn't know what to make of this man. Here was a British Intelligence Officer, in complete contradistinction to British Imperial policy at the time, telling him that he would lead the Jews to an independent state. British policy, by 1936, was certainly against an independent Jewish state, and in fact had consistently frustrated attempts to expand Jewish immigration into Palestine. This policy was to become more pronounced with the passing years, and as World War loomed on the horizon, the British limited Jewish immigration into Palestine to a mere trickle...

“The year 1936, when Wingate arrived, marked the beginning of the Arab rebellion against both British rule and Jewish settlement in Palestine. The British responded by sending army units after the rebels, with some success... Part of the problem was that the Jews had a static defense in their settlements while the roaming Arab gangs were mobile, and the Arab perpetrators of attacks frequently could not be found. The Haganah, the Jewish Defense Organization, had been founded in 1920, but it had done little until the outbreak of the riots in 1936. Even then, they were still committed to a policy of "havlaga"—self-restraint, which led many later

to leave and join the more radical Irgun or Stern Gang, both of whom advocated a harsher response to Arab terror.
“Wingate was no less disappointed with the British Army's response to Arab rebellion and terror than with the Jewish concept of static defense. The Arabs roamed in from Syria or Jordan, hid in the hills and caves, and used hit-and-run tactics in order to escape to safety. The British Army by contrast, used the roads to chase the perpetrators. Even the British Air Force, when called in, wasn't effective in seeking out the Arab gangs when the Arabs already had a well-planned out escape route or hiding place. The Arabs knew the land well, and the night was theirs alone. Jews set up many stockade and watchtower settlements at night during the Arab riots and afterwards, and they settled in to wait for the Arabs. But they were in fear, and the Arabs were not. The Arabs, if they chose not to attack a British military convoy or a Jewish settlement, would be left alone. The Jews could never say the same about themselves. By 1936, neither could the British. This is where Wingate came in.

“Wingate was a man of exceptional direction-finding skills and an uncanny ability to gauge distances, terrain, and the movements of others. He had already proven that in the Sudan. He brought this experience to bear in Palestine... The Haganah leadership was "not particularly enamored of Wingate when he called them faint-hearted for their doubts and urged them to take the offensive against the Arabs themselves".

“The irrepressible Wingate tried his luck with taking more offensive operations against Arab infiltrators with General Wavell, Commander of British Forces in Palestine. Wingate's plan was tentatively approved, and when he wasn't careening at a mad pace with his jeep around Palestine, Wingate thought of how he would put it into action. He first looked for infiltrators crossing the Jordan, and found none. Soon after, he tried to convince members of Kibbutz Afikim, near the Jordan river, to come on offensive operations against the Arabs with him. As impressed as he was by their guarding of the settlement, he was enraged by their failure to take more initiative. Wingate went to the Haganah Commander whom he had met his first day in Palestine, Wilenski, and requested men to accompany him on "investigative" missions into Arab territory. At first he was refused, but he persisted, and soon after the Haganah granted him the men...

“He first went to the settlement of Hanita, which had been the object of a number of Arab attacks. Moshe Dayan was stationed there by the Haganah at the time, as was the above-mentioned Zvi Brenna. They were ready to take the offensive to the Arab villages themselves, across the border or not, legal or not. When some of the Jews protested that entering Arab villages could lead to their arrest, Wingate told them to "leave these little formalities to me". He was, after all, a British officer, even if he identified heart and soul with the Zionist endeavor.

“The first expedition took place in early 1938. The Haganah members hoped an Arab informant would lead them to an Arab village they suspected of harboring Arab attackers about 20 miles away, as they weren't sure they could find their way back at night by themselves. When Wingate was told about the plan he was astounded. He had the Arab brought before him and, after questioning him in Arabic, realized that he was preparing to lead the unsuspecting Jews into a trap. "This man is planning to lead you to your deaths”, he shouted, swinging around on the watching Jews. “Now let us stop all this nonsense. It is about time a soldier took charge of you. You wish to go on a raid against the Arabs to-night. All right. You shall go. But this wretch will not lead you. I will take you there."

“They set out at dusk. It was the first Jewish offensive. They headed into Lebanon, and then doubled back. By three o'clock in the morning, after 30 miles of silently walking, Wingate brought them to the village. He went ahead alone. When they heard a shot, they moved into their pre-arranged positions. There were more shots, and then a hail of gunfire, and the Arabs came out—straight into the trap Wingate had laid for them. Dayan and Brenna held their fire until the Arabs were completely surrounded. Those they didn't kill they took prisoner, and found out where they had hid their arms which they had used to sabotage British military installations and Jewish settlements. The Jews and Wingate took the rifles and headed back, just as careful as when they had come. The slightest sound could alarm unseen Arab patrols, and Wingate could be rather unforgiving to men who accidentally cracked a stick or unloosed a stone and sent it scattering down a hillside. But that was nothing compared to the ruthlessness with which he would useto deal with Arabs who harbored information regarding terrorist weapons, hideouts, plans, or intentions.

“The British weren't at all pleased when they heard about this raid. Wingate hadn't told them, he hadn't consulted them, and more than that, he had taken Jews on an offensive raid—that was far more than just defending themselves within their own settlements. Wavell recalled him to Jerusalem. Things didn't look good. "Hayedid (the friend) is in trouble with the British over the raid", one secret Haganah message relayed. "From that moment on, every Jew in the (Jewish) Agency and the secret army was prepared to trust him with their secrets and their lives."

“As it happened, Wingate was let off with a mere rebuke. But more than that, he managed to convince Wavell that he could do much more to wipe out the Arab gangs causing such damage to the pipeline bringing oil from Iraq to the port of Haifa. Wavell gave him the permission to continue operating in northern Palestine— to the chagrin of many other British officers. Wingate was actually supposed to be an intelligence officer based in Nazareth—but he rarely went there. Conceivably, too, the British military thought he was protecting the pipeline from sabotage. He was actually leading reprisal and deterrence raids of Jewish soldiers against Arab gangs... Wingate, meanwhile, had recruited, with General Wavell's approval, a number of British soldiers to serve with him as well. These he mixed in with the Jews so that Jews and British were serving together under Wingate's command.

“Wingate was uncanny not only in his sense of direction and ability to gauge distances, but he also knew just where to go after an Arab raid occurred. He would go into a village, fire a shot, and if there was no response, move on to the next one. When there was a shot back he would immediately deploy his men and tell them exctly where the Arabs would go and what they would do. In the words of Moshe Dayan, "He was never wrong." Dayan continued, "I never knew him to lose an engagement. He was never worried about odds. If we were twenty, and the Arabs were two hundred, or if we were at the bottom of a hill and they were at the top, he would say: ‘All right, there is a way to beat them. There is some way in which, with a decisive stroke, we can turn the situation in our favour’. There were many who served with him from Ein Harod who later became officers in the Israeli Army which fought and defeated the Arabs, but they were not the only ones who benefited from his training. In some sense, every leader of the Israeli Army even today (this was written in 1955) is a disciple of Wingate. He gave us our technique, he was the inspiration of our tactics, he was our dynamic."

“He was amazingly successful. He became something of a legend among the Jews of Palestine and the Arabs put a price on his head. Wavell gave Wingate the approval—to the shock and disbelief of the British military men—for Wingate to start a school for training "Jewish settlers in the art of making guerrilla war". This was based at Ein Harod, where Wingate, in the shadow of Gideon, felt so at home. There was jubilation all over Jewish Palestine. Men appeared from the settlements all over the country to volunteer. They took part in continuous operations. The biggest one fought by Wingate's Special Night Squads was at Dakumiyah, on the slopes of Mount Tabor near the Sea of Galilee where one of the most problematic gangs was located. The Arabs were well-entrenched in their positions and armed well. The battle started at 1 p.m., but Wingate called it off and waited for dusk. By 3 a.m. it was all over. The Arab gangs were decisively defeated. Wingate, however, was wounded and nearly died from his wounds. His Jewish comrades brought him to the hospital.

“Even the grudging British Police couldn't deny what a victory it was. It removed one of the most dangerous gangs of thieves from the area. But while he received a promotion for the operation, it was the beginning of the end for Wingate in Palestine. He had simply been too successful in his work. The Jews were becoming a fighting force. And Wingate showed his happiness at this fact at every opportunity. Turning Jews into formidable fighters was not really in British interests...

“In 1939 the British issued the White Paper, which seriously restricted Jewish immigration to Palestine and offered no hope for an independent Jewish state... It was late 1939 when Wingate was posted home, to England... He became famed as a warrior in East Africa and as a general in Burma, often having his Jewish assistant, Akavia, accompany him as his second-in-command. He had dreams of leading a Jewish Army to independence once World War II was over, but he never got the chance. He was killed over Burma in 1944.

“Orde Wingate was an exceptional man, and a gift to the Jewish people in his time. He was always champing at the bit, ready to move ahead with plans which had not yet come to fruition in other men's minds. He was ready to take wild chances—something that scared his military superiors, and often earned him rebuke or even encouraged others to view him as unprofessional. But he was invariably successful. In this respect he is like General Ariel Sharon. Until Wingate arrived in Palestine, the Jewish attitude towards Arab marauders and Arab terror was one of self-defense only. The establishment of the Special Night squads in 1936 marked a change in this attitude from a purely defensive to a more offensive ethos. After Wingate the night, which had previously belonged to the Arabs alone, no longer did so. And even though he never came back to serve the people he loved and help establish the state he so longed to see, his training and example left an indelible imprint on the emerging standards of the fledgling Israeli Army. A major part of the reason why the state of Israel was able to withstand its enemies in 1948, and thus see the renewal of Jewish sovereignty in the land of Israel after more than 1800 years, was due to the unparalleled and heroic efforts of Orde Wingate and his group of Jewish fighters comprising the Night Squads."

The main Orde Wingate website reveals another innovation that the Englishman brought to Palestine:

"While Wingate treated ordinary Arab citizens with respect & targeted only known terrorists, there was one exception. Wingate received permission to set up an Non-Commissioned Officers (NCO) course at Ein Herod. The students were members of the Haganah with British instructors. In the middle of September the leader of the Ein Harod settlement, Chaim Sturmann, was killed by a land mine. Wingate reacted with his emotions upon hearing the death of his close friend. He ordered SNS men to the Arab village of Beit Shean, which was known to harbour guerillas. Wanting to install in the hearts of the inhabitants fear of the authorities to help prevent any future actions, Wingate in an uncontrolled fury descended upon the village, several civilians being killed and some buildings destroyed. Sturmann and Wingate had often argued over the idea of collective punishment. Sturmann had counseled moderation and cooperation with Arabs, and would argue that punishing an entire village for aiding guerillas or harboring them was wrong and counter-productive. Wingate would argue he wanted villagers who assist guerillas to be more frightened of the SNS and British terror than of guerilla terror. "On the one hand he, demanded that innocent not be harmed. On the other hand, he knew that he faced a dilemma: can one observe this rule in a battle against gangs which receive assistance from the residents of the villages?"(Yousef Eshko, A Common Soldier, p176. Issued by the Israeli Ministry Of Defence in 1993)

Wingate was removed because of a change in British policy during 1939. By that time the balance of power strategy in Europe had gone very wrong. After assisting Hitler for years in eroding the Versailles settlement—to curb France—it was now decided to cut him down to size over Poland. In order to secure its position in the Middle East Britain adopted a new Palestine policy, announcing that it was to be brought to independence in six years with a final quota of 50,000 Jews being permitted to settle.

But the assassination policy was to have unforeseen consequences for Britain after the war when the Jewish military capacity developed by the British security services was redirected against the Imperial power itself (and the local inhabitants) in a terrorist campaign for an independent Jewish State.

Assasination policies can have weird outcomes. It was so successful in Ireland—in ending the Provos war—that it put Sinn Fein in government and made it the major Catholic party in the North.

Pat Walsh

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