Last month we described how TUC General Secretary, Len Murray, proposed to the Annual Trades Union Congress in 1974 the adoption of a Report on Industrial Democracy which demanded the enactment of enabling legislation in order to provide for 50% worker representation both on supervisory boards within the private sector, as well as on the policy-making boards of nationalised industries.

Resolution No. 17 before that same Conference came out in opposition to any mandatory imposition of supervisory boards with worker directors. Len Murray maintained that there was no necessary incompatibility between that Resolution and the General Council's Report, which was technically speaking correct, since the Report itself clearly held that the enforcement of any such legislative entitlement to 50% worker representation on the board ought to be a voluntary question decided upon by trade union members in each individual enterprise. The fact was, however, that the proposer of Resolution No. 17, Eddie Marsden of the Amalgamated Union of Engineering Workers, had made it perfectly clear that his purpose was to oppose in principle any concept of worker representation on company boards whatever the circumstances. Despite Len Murray's hopes that the conflict of opinion on this question could be wished away by some technical reconciliation, the contrasting approach of Marsden and himself inevitably set the framework for the type of debate which followed.

W. Johnson, M.P. of the Transport, Salaried Staffs Association put the following arguments forward in support of Resolution No. 68 which called for a system of elected and trade union based worker directors for all nationalised transport boards:

"The trend in the 1970s is towards greater involvement in decision-making, and this trend must be reflected in the relationship between manager and employee, on the factory floor or in the office. It is no longer sufficient for management just to consult the trade union or staff representatives on plans they have already decided to implement. What we need now is the right of working people to take part in the actual decision-making process themselves. Any such development might help to stop some of the more ill-considered proposals which management advocate and which often result in walkouts, stoppages and industrial chaos.

"If workers' representatives were appointed to policy-making boards they would take part in decision-making which would go a long way towards the workers accepting, for example, new production methods, new techniques, re-organisation and major changes, because the workers would have their own colleagues on the board to make sure their interests were protected. A great deal of trouble today is caused by rumours spreading of changes which affect the lives of hundreds of thousands of our people. Much of this anxiety, worry and suspicion would be avoided if the workers' representatives on the board knew about major changes, such as mergers, at the same time as the management and were part of the decision. I believe that the time is now opportune for us to go forward and take this vital step in industrial democracy."

One particular problem arising from the question of board representation for trade unionists was tackled in the following manner by C. H. Urwin of the Transport and General Workers' Union:

"On this question of sitting on boards, does it compromise the collective bargaining function? Well, it can or it cannot depending on just how you approach this question. But from a practical point of view, I have experience with other trade unionists as a representative on the National Freight Corporation which controls about 50 publicly-owned companies…What we are able to do here is to make decisions on things like the location of new areas of employment, where you put your capital injection, what sort of plant, equipment and things of this kind are concerned, and you can directly assist the workers in the industry without compromising the collective bargaining function. I would be very happy to make way as an appointed representative for an elected representative from the people working in the industry."

The TUC General Council's proposals for worker directors were, however, to be again criticised by the General Secretary of the General and Municipal Workers' Union, David Basnett, when he added his voice in support of composite motion No. 17:

"…As far as we are concerned, we agree with 90% of this Report. We agree with the need to strengthen trade union organisation, to extend the scope of collective bargaining. However, it is at this point we part company with the Report because the Report then goes on to say that there should be the mandatory introduction of supervisory boards. I think there has got to be a more flexible approach to this subject, an approach that reflects our different industrial structures, that allows us to harmonise with our collective bargaining systems and allows an organic growth from those systems—systems which we know, which we have confidence in and which our members understand. For that reason we support this Composite."

D. Basnett was joined in his opposition to this proposal from the TUC General Council by E. A. Hammond of the Electrical, Electronic, Telecommunications and Plumbing Union, who argued:

"We have in past years made lonely interjections into the industrial democracy debate against the idea of worker directors. 'Right old reactionaries' did Jack Jones (of the TGWU) call us in 1968 for opposing the idea—and we welcome into our ranks the AUEW. Jack's resort to such words was probably to cover a lack of argument against our contentions. Such lack continues and the grave fog of woolly imprecision as to what is meant by the worker director proposal has not been dispelled by Len Murray. We have held that our basic and historic function in the trade unions is quite distinct from that of management. Our vital task is to see that the power which exists in management is not used against the workers' interest. Inevitably the trade union board member would get involved and agree with decisions that the union negotiators would find unacceptable. Negotiators would be compromised because some of their colleagues had participated in making this decision.

"…It simply is not good enough for Len Murray, for the General Council, like some great octupus, to swallow all our differences and rely on the digestive system of the beast…The proposal for worker directors, for dual representation, is unnecessary. Sure we want a greater say for our work people, but only through the unions. The General Council shuld not just take into account the motion. They should amend their document accordingly, or if 'amend' is too strong a word, then maybe they would accept 'tidy up'. I support motion 17 and oppose 68."

After this no-punches-pulled speech from Hammond against any system of worker directors whatsoever, the contrary viewpoint was put with equal vigour in the following speech by B. Dix of the National Union of Public Employees:

"My union supports the General Council Report and opposes composite motion No. 17. We oppose Composite 17 because, as I think has been demonstrated by the contribution of the combined resource of Eddie Marsden, on the one hand, and the Electricians and Plumbers, on the other, it introduces a confusing and contradictory mixture of ideas which we cannot afford to have on such an important subject. We think too that it is no good the General Secretary saying: 'You can have composite 17 and the Supplementary Report.' You cannot because the whole basis of composite 17 undermines the basic concepts set out in the General Council's Report. David Basnett said: 'We accept 90% of the General Council's Report." But it is the 10% he does not accept, that is the important 10%.

"We think that basically composite 17 is dangerous. I am very sorry to see some of my comrades going along with it because what it really does is to move dangerously close to accepting the employers' philosophy to restrict the role of trade unions to the pure collective bargaining process and nothing else. We see trade unions not simply as fruit machines in which workers put tanners to get the jackpot. We see trade unions as agents of social change. That is the difference between us and the employers. If you pass composite 17 you will be the toast of every board of directors in the City of London tonight."

In reply, Eddie Marsden of the AUEW summed up his argument as follows:

"We are opposed particularly to worker directors in private companies for the reasons I have already stated. The difference between collective bargaining machinery and supervisory boards is that supervisory boards bring the workers in line with the running of this particular system at a time when it is finishing, and we ought to finish it completely. On the arguments that we have got to have some supervisory boards for investment demands of companies, and so on, it is important to note that in Italy only a few weeks ago, the Italian unions by their normal collective bargaining machinery forced the major Fiat Corporation, and a number of other major companies and public industries as well, to change their investment plans and construction of new plants from the North of Italy down into the South. We can do that and much more, by the strengthening of our normal machinery…and I am very glad indeed that I can say to the EETPU: 'I am glad you're with us'."

Replying on behalf of the TSSA, W. Johnson, M.P., made the further point:

"I am always surprised at the attitude of some people who say that the time is never opportune to go forward with major changes which can affect the working lives of all our people. I reject this utterly because I believe this is a reflection on the people up and down the country whom we represent. I believe that workers now have the intelligence, the ability and the capacity to share in management in the way that is suggested in motion 68…I would ask you to support motion 68 and oppose composite 17."

The final speech in the debate was the reply made by TUC General Secretary, Len Murray, on behalf of the General Council:

"…Eddie Marsden I think addressed himself more to the defects of the capitalist system—and he deliberately did this—than to some of the other angles of the Report. Indeed, there are areas on which I could find agreement with Eddie in terms of the need to develop, for example, areas of public ownership. What we are saying here is that these proposals are by no means incompatible with public ownership; indeed they are the corollary. They are the way in which we can transform the previous form of nationalisation into a more dynamic form, involving work people in the industry as such…

"…I want to deal with the question of mandatory imposition and the question of worker directors. In paragraph 106 of the Report, we say this: 'Provisions about supervisory boards in the new Companies' Act would only become operative where there is trade union recognition, and the representation of workers could only be through bona fide trade unions choosing to exercise this right.' In moving this Report I made it quite clear that this applied to the nationalised industries and to the public services as well. It is open to you to choose whether you go along this particular road. I hope Mr. Basnett will accept that restatement of the position as meeting the point he was making. And I hope, too, that Congress will accept that we would not want to deny the right of unions in those firms and those industries where they do want to go down this road, even though we accept the right of others not to go down this particular road if that is their wish at this time…

"…The point has been made by people at this rostrum that indeed this is a natural development of collective bargaining…The demand for participation in decision-making has always been there. We have developed this to a large extend in terms of recognition and in terms of wage negotiations. The essential point is that the outcome of these wage negotiations themselves is determined by what is happening in terms of major decisions by the companies as such. We want to be in those decisions. This has been illustrated by the fact that in many companies unions have pushed into that field; they have spearheaded. Now is the time, we believe, to broaden and deepen this advance."

Having argued the case for the General Council Report on Industrial Democracy, however, Len Murray was not prepared to have the issue moving forward in the direction of workers control recognised as the contentious issue it inevitably had to be if it was to represent any breaking of new ground in terms of trade union traditions. Instead, he sought to reconcile opposites and emerge with the appearance of consensus along the following lines:

"In conclusion, some people have said that they are going to vote against the composite motion because they believe it is in opposition to the Report. Certainly some of the things said from the rostrum may lead you to believe it is, and it is up to you. We are leaving this to Congress. If you do not think that the composite motion is consistent with the Report, then it is up to you to vote against it. If it is carried, however, the General Council will take it side by side with the Report, not as being a challenge to the Report but as throwing a light on certain aspects of the Report, and use it in the development of companies' legislation and in the discussion which must continue. Therefore, what I am asking you to do is to endorse this Report, to accept the TSSA motion, and to accept the composite motion, if you are satisfied that it is consistent with the Report as such."

In his concluding sentence Murray told Congress to vote for everything before it—he did not mind—which was precisely what Congress went on to do. The technical compatibility of composite 17 with the General Council Report was hardly the point. Speakers such as E. A. Hammond and B. Dix had demonstrated from quite definite opposing viewpoints that at the very least there was a contradiction in both spirit and motivation involved, and it was precisely such factors as spirit and motivation which would be decisive if any advance was to be made in industrial democracy. The issue was not fought out decisively and the verbal reconciliation which was attempted only resulted in a confused outcome. The TUC General Council interpreted the Congress vote as giving it the go-ahead to demand the enactment of enabling legislation for 50% worker representation on company boards. The TUC submission to the Bullock Committee on Industrial Democracy, however, came under fire from the EETPU on the right, the GMWU on the centre, and the AUEW on the left—since these unions also felt that the indecisiveness represented by the all-things-to-all-men Congress vote justified their continued opposition to any system of worker directors.

Hopefully the Irish trade union movement will be in a position to avoid the pitfalls which inevitably result from such indecisiveness and such papering-over of important differences whenever it decides to get to grips with clarifying its demands on industrial democracy. In the meantime, developments in this area subsequent to that 1974 Congress of the TUC, and particularly the diverse evidence submitted to the Bullock Committee on Industrial Democracy will be looked at in greater detail in a future issue.